Consumer-Choice Markets: Lessons From FEHBP Mental Health Coverage
The FEHBP experience shows why, at least in mental health, it takes more than consumer choice to make markets work.
b y S a n d r a M . F o o t e A n d S t a n l e y B . Jo n e s F e de ra l po lic y an al ys ts are debating proposals to restructure the Medicare program as a consumer-choice model along the lines of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). A popular assumption underlying the current interest in consumer-choice markets is that giving enrollees choices among plans will drive competing insurers to improve product quality and efficiency. The validity of this assumption warrants careful review. As illustrated by the history of mental health coverage in the FEHBP, competitive pressures in consumer-choice markets and the use of managed care techniques to control costs may result in more restricted benefits and reduced plan payments, particularly for patients with severe and persistent conditions. Although there are unique aspects to mental health services and benefits, patients with other types of conditions that also are lacking clear treatment protocols and outcome measures may be similarly affected. The FEHBP experience suggests that for insurance markets to work effectively for such high-cost populations, employers or other plan sponsors and policymakers must ensure the adequacy of coverage, benefit financing levels, and performance requirements for competing plans.
BENEFIT LIMITS
n IN THE FEHBP. Until President Bill Clinton announced in June 1999 that FEHBP plans will be required to institute parity between benefits for mental health and other conditions, insurers in the FEHBP national plans had been allowed to have separate benefit restrictions in place and had greatly restricted mental health benefits.
1 The Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) Federal Employees Plan (FEP) standard option is by far the largest plan in the FEHBP, with 1.8 million enrollees in 1999 (nearly 44 percent of FEHBP enrollees). 2 The Blues greatly reduced mental health benefits in the FEP standard option in 1982 to curb costs and decrease the adverse risk selection associated with having richer benefits than its national competitors. The new design included a lower annual limit on psychiatric inpatient days, a daily inpatient copayment, and an annual limit of twenty-five professional visits, including mental health therapy. Although the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) required BCBS to enrich mental health benefits in the FEP standard option somewhat in 1983, the plan has maintained special benefit limitations and costsharing provisions for mental health services to date (Exhibit 1).
The mental health benefits under the FEP and other national plans in the FEHBP have remained fairly stable over the past decade (Exhibit 2), but they are meager from a chronic-care perspective. Throughout the 1990s the OPM resisted any decreases in mental health benefits and encouraged insurers to expand mental health coverage but also to hold down premium increases. The FEP standard option now includes a daily copayment of $150 for psychiatric inpatient hospital stays in preferred hospitals, 40 percent coinsurance on outpatient group and/or individual therapy, and an annual limit of twenty-five therapy sessions. The plan does not cover marital or family counseling, nonhospital residential treatment programs, or intensive outpatient treatment programs. n IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR. By contrast, among employers surveyed by Mercer Foster Higgins in 1997, 75 percent of those with any separate limits on mental health services had no separate annual limits on the number of inpatient days or outpatient services for mental health treatment in their most prevalent plan. In addition, more than half of all surveyed employers covered nonhospital residential treatment, and more than 60 percent covered intensive nonresidential treatment for mental health conditions. 3 A third of all employers with managed behavioral health care carve-out programs and 25 percent of all surveyed employers had no separate benefit restrictions on mental health services in their largest plans.
n FEHBP INSURERS' RATIONALE. There are several reasons why the national insurers in the FEHBP implemented and maintained restricted mental health benefits in their plans. The major one is avoidance of adverse risk selection. Since most consumers, especially those who use few services, are extremely price sensitive, insurers cannot afford $50,000 to let their costs and premiums rise to noncompetitive levels. Insurers therefore must guard against offering much more generous coverage than their competitors do for services that attract high-cost enrollees. FEP mental health benefits were a target for BCBS restrictions in the 1980s, in part because survey results suggested that these benefits, if richer than competitors offered, attracted moreexpensive enrollees than average. There is little risk of losing enrollment by virtue of restricting mental health benefits, because generally so few enrollees (5-10 percent) use these services each year. 4 Moreover, insurers are likely to have lower average costs if enrollees who are sensitive to such benefit reductions leave their plans. And, unlike employers, insurers do not have financial incentives to enhance mental health coverage to increase employees' productivity or reduce absenteeism. In spite of the theoretical desirability of risk adjusters to focus competition on quality and efficiency, the FEHBP has no risk adjusters in place to help insurers defray the added costs of serving sicker enrollees than their competitors do. Also, experts agree that none of today's risk-adjustment methodologies comes close to offsetting the financial advantages of avoiding predictably high cost enrollees through product design and targeted marketing.
Some health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the FEHBP offer more-generous mental health benefits than the national insurers such as BCBS offer, but the HMOs generally have comprehensive utilization management programs and contracted provider networks to curtail expenditures. HMOs in the national capital area have all eliminated their annual maximums on covered psychiatric inpatient days and outpatient visits for mental health treatment, as shown in Exhibit 2. Whether these recently liberalized benefits have caused many enrollees to switch to the HMOs is not known, but several analysts familiar with the program doubt it. They speculate that the few enrollees who look at these benefits as a factor in plan selection are likely 6 Based on data from many large and mediumsize employers nationally, the Hay Group estimates that behavioral health services dropped from over 6.1 percent of claims costs in 1988 to 3.2 percent in 1998. 7 n UR VARIABILITY. Aside from general agreement about the lack of medical necessity for many extended inpatient stays, there still is little consensus in the mental health field about practice guidelines for many conditions. 8 Wide variations exist in treatment philosophies and preferences regarding types of settings, therapies, provider specialties, and intensity and duration of care. Lack of consensus makes it more difficult for patients and providers to marshal support for authorizations based on quality as a countervailing force to market pressures to constrain price. Reaching agreement on optimal treatment may be especially difficult for patients with serious and persistent conditions, because these patients frequently have more than one diagnosis, which can encompass a wide range of and fluctuations in severity over time, and highly individualized care needs that reflect varied health and social circumstances. In such cases, the complex and individual nature of the cases and lack of scientific evidence to support certain treatments leave much room for disagreement between the treating and reviewing clinicians and for reviewer discretion as to treatment authorizations.
Review decisions also may be influenced by numerous nonclinical variables such as what level of funding the purchaser allocates for services (through a capitation contract or expense targets); whether or not incurred costs are outstripping premium or capitation revenues; how the purchaser has structured performance requirements in the MBHO or insurer contract; the purchaser's willingness to pay for extra-contractual benefits; purchasers' and plans' sensitivities to patients' or providers' complaints; and any risk-sharing arrangements among the parties (purchaser, insurer, contracted MBHO, and providers). 9 These factors do not necessarily work to enhance product quality and are not factors that consumers are usually aware of or are likely to influence through their choice of plans.
QUALITY CONTROL THROUGH CONSUMER CHOICE
How well consumers can influence quality and efficiency through their choice of plans depends on their access to relevant comparative information and their use of those data in decision making. Because most consumers do not know their future treatment needs, they do not tend to focus on mental health services as major determinants of plan choice. Although consumers who anticipate using mental health services can compare the benefits across plans as indicators of the limits of plan liability, benefits are not a guarantee of payment if authorizations of coverage are required. Patients and providers can, of course, protest and appeal denials of coverage in various ways, but this level of case-specific influence on plan performance is very different from, and independent of, consumers' wielding power through their choice of plans.
Furthermore, consumers who anticipate using mental health services generally have little information comparing the performance of plans or providers. In the FEHBP, for example, consumers receive no comparative data on clinical outcomes across plans or providers, and although some survey data concerning consumer satisfaction are provided to consumers during open enrollment, the data are not specific to patients with various types of illnesses. The Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS), which the FEHBP is now implementing, still contains no questions regarding patients' satisfaction with treatment of any specific types of conditions. The FEHBP is not alone in this regard. Although many national and local organizations are working diligently to develop mental health practice guidelines, outcome measures, and standardized data collection methods, few data are available to permit valid, comparative assessments of performance among plans, MBHOs, or providers. 10 Standardized patient-satisfaction surveys such as CAHPS are used by some MBHOs and plans, but they generally reflect mainly the experiences of relatively healthy patients, not those with severe and persistent illnesses.
DISCUSSION
The history of mental health coverage in the FEHBP suggests that it is not reasonable to rely on consumer-choice market dynamics and managed care techniques alone to guide the evolution of insurance benefits and payments; active involvement of purchasers and policymakers is needed to ensure that markets function effectively. Otherwise, cost pressures in the market may lead to reductions in plan payouts, especially for patients with severe and persistent conditions who rely heavily on services such as mental health treatment, rehabilitation, home health, and pain management that may be viewed as discretionary. In an environment where price pressures are stronger than countervailing forces supporting product quality, there is a danger of excessive reduction in benefit payments. As inflationary pressures build in the health care sector and as new medical technologies alter the composition of plan expenses, competing insurers are likely to confront increasing pressures to further limit coverage and costs. Consumers as individual purchasers seem poorly positioned to determine what clinical conditions and treatments should be included in pooled risk arrangements or to influence how plans are administered to make them cost-effective and socially beneficial. If we are to avoid excessive reductions and distortions in health care coverage, policymakers and plan sponsors will need to act on behalf of the minority of persons who are severely and persistently ill, by structuring benefits, plan performance requirements, flexibility in plan management, and funding levels of competing plans to take the needs of these patients into account.
